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ABSTRACT  
Algebraic cryptanalysis usually requires to recover the secret key by solving 
polynomial equations. Faugère’s F4 is a well-known Gröbner bases algorithm to solve 
this problem. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based 
algebraic attacks, namely, any information won’t be got if we couldn’t work out the 
Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In this paper, we in-depth research 
the F4 algorithm over GF(2). By using S-polynomials to replace critical pairs and 
computing the normal form of the productions with respect to the field equations in 
certain steps, many “redundant” reductors are avoided during the computation process 
of the F4 algorithm. By slightly modifying the logic of F4 algorithm, we solve the 
univariate polynomials appeared in the algorithm and then back-substitute the values 
of the solved variables at each iteration of the algorithm. We call our improvements 
Middle-Solving F4. The heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving overcomes the 
drawback of algebraic attacks and well suits algebraic attacks. It has never been 
applied to the Gröbner bases algorithm before. Experiments to some Hidden Field 
Equation instances and some classical benchmarks (Cyclic 6, Gonnet83) show that 
Middle-Solving F4 is faster and uses less memory than Faugère’s F4. 
KEYWORDS 
Gröbner bases, F4, algebraic attacks, normal form, field equations, 
Middle-Solving F4, multivariate polynomial systems of equations 
*Correspondence 
Wansu Bao, Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, 
Zhengzhou 450000, China  
E-mail: glhhl0773@126.com 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As one of the most efficient attacks, algebraic attacks have been successful in 
breaking several stream ciphers, public key cryptosystems, and a few block ciphers. 
Algebraic attacks try to reformulate a cipher as a (very large) system of polynomial 
equations and then find the secret key by solving such a system. In this paper, we 
focus on the polynomial system solving part. The problem of solving polynomial 
systems over finite fields is known to be very difficult (non-deterministic 
polynomial-time hard complete in general). The security of many cryptographic 
systems is based on this problem, which makes developing algorithms for solving 
polynomial systems be a hot research topic in cryptanalysis. 
Gröbner bases, first introduced in [6], are by now a fundamental tool for tracking 
this problem and become a powerful method for algebraic attacks. In addition, 
Gröbner bases can be used to determine optimal equations in terms of degree and/or 
variables in the algebraic attacks. What’s more, Albrecht and Cid [14] use Gröbner 
bases algorithms to perform a consistency check. This allows them to determine 
whether given pair satisfies the considered differential characteristic. Cryptanalysis 
involving the Gröbner bases algorithms has been claimed to attack many 
cryptosystems: multivariate public key cryptosystems such as HFE [1], Minrank [2], 
McEliece [3], stream ciphers such as Bivium [4], hash function such as SHA-1 [5]. 
Finding Gröbner bases is a difficult task, which requires lots of computational 
resources. Algorithms to compute Gröbner bases have evolved a great deal since the 
first one was proposed in 1965 by Bruno Buchberger [6]. A significant leap in 
performance was achieved with the introduction of the F4[7] and F5[8] algorithms by 
Jean-Charles Faugère. In fact, F4 and F5 can be regarded as the two sides of 
Faugère’s algorithm: F4 algorithm uses Gaussian elimination to speed up the 
time-consuming step of “critical pair” reductions. F5 algorithm uses a more powerful 
criterion to remove useless critical pairs. In recent years, many new variants of F5 are 
proposed and discussed, for example, EF5[9],  F5C[10],  G2V [11], GVW[12] and 
many other algorithms. However, the research of F4 is mainly focus on the 
implementation of algorithm. Therefore, its theory needs a further research. 
A variant of F4 is designed by Antoine Joux and Vanessa Vitse[15] at SCC10 to 
compute the Gröbner bases of a set of polynomial systems having the similar shape. 
Their variant consists of the two routines F4Precomp and F4Remake. For 
precomputation purposes, F4Precomp run the original F4 algorithm on the first 
system and store only the useful polynomial multiples ( , )i iu f  coming from the 
critical pairs. For each subsequent system, run the F4Remake to directly work on the 
previously stored multiples ( , )i iu f . A little unfortunately, the applicability of Antoine 
Joux’s variant is somewhat limiting. Firstly, maybe we couldn’t get the Gröbner bases 
from F4Precomp if the initial system is difficult to solve. Secondly, polynomial 
systems having the similar shape doesn’t mean they are the same. A little difference 
may lead error in the F4Remake. It is hard to guarantee the correctness of the 
algorithm. 
In cryptanalysis, any information leakages may result in serious threat to 
cryptosystems. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based 
algebraic attacks, namely, we won’t get any information if we couldn’t work out the 
Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In addition, lots of the 
cryptosystems are defined over GF(2). So computing the Gröbner bases over GF(2) is 
especially important. In this paper, our goals are to accelerate the F4 algorithm over 
GF(2) and make Gröbner bases be more practical for algebraic attacks. By using 
S-polynomials to replace critical pair and computing the normal form of the 
productions ( i iu f ) with respect to the field equations in certain steps, many 
“redundant” reductors are avoided. By slightly modifying the logic of F4 algorithm, 
we solve the univariate polynomials appeared in the algorithm and then 
back-substitute the values of the solved variables at each iteration of the algorithm. In 
our algorithm, even though we couldn’t work out the Gröbner bases, some 
information of the variable still leak during the computation process. We call our 
variant Middle-Solving F4. We must stress that the heuristic strategy of 
Middle-Solving has never been applied to Gröbner bases algorithms until now. We 
mention that our heuristic strategy, by design, will boost the performance of all 
Gröbner bases algorithms in the same way as it aids F4 algorithm. We present 
experimental results to demonstrate that the Middle-Solving strategy has the ability to 
improve the F4 algorithm drastically, and make algebraic attacks be more practical.  
The paper is structured as follows. First we do some preliminaries in Sect. 2. In 
Sect.3 we do some small improvements to make F4 be more adapted for the finite 
fields over GF(2). In Sect. 4 we describe our Middle-Solving F4 and introduce 




This section describes the fundamental notations and the conventions in this paper. 
We briefly give the main definitions needed to define a Gröbner bases in a 
characterization useful for our purpose and simply describe the F4 algorithm.  
2.1 Basic Knowledge 
Let K be a field and 1 2[ , , , ]nR K x x x   be the polynomial ring over the field K with 
n variables. Let T  denote a fixed admissible ordering on the monomials of R. The 
head monomial and head term of the polynomial p R with respect to T  are 
denoted by HM(p) and HT(p) respectively. A Gröbner bases of 
1 2=( , , , )mI F f f f    with respect to T  is a finite list G of polynomials in I that 
satisfies the properties =G I   and for every p I  there exists g G  satisfying 
( ) | ( )HM g HM p . Buchberger first found an algorithm to compute such a basis [6]. 
We describe Buchberger’s algorithm in the following way and introduce some 
definitions at the same time: set G=F, then iterate the following two steps. 
 Choose a pair ,p q G  that has not yet been considered, and construct its 
S-polynomial
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
( , )
( ) ( )
lcm HM p HM q lcm HM p HM q
S p q p q
HT p HT q
     
 Top-reduce ( , )S p q  with respect to G. That is, 0 ( , )r S p q , and while 





     until no more top-reductions of jr  are possible after j 
iterations. If 0jr  , we say that S(p,q) reduces to zero with respect to G. if 
0jr  , we say that S top-reduces to a normal form jr , and append jr  to G.  
The algorithm terminates once the S-polynomials of all pairs ,p q G  
top-reduce to zero. 
2.2 F4 
The reduction of selected pairs is by far the biggest time-consuming part of the 
Buchberger’s algorithm. The main idea of Faugère’s F4 algorithm is to use linear 
algebra to simultaneously reduce a large number of pairs. F4 works with critical pairs 
instead of S-polynomials: the critical pair 1 2( , )C f f  of two polynomials 1f  and 2f  
is defined as the tuple(lcm,u1,f1,u2,f2) where lcm=LCM(LM(f1), LM(f2)), , the least 







 . At each iteration step, a 
Macaulay-style matrix is constructed, whose columns correspond to monomials and 
rows to polynomials. This matrix contains the products ( )i iu f  coming from the 
selected critical pairs (classically, all pairs with the lowest total degree lcm, but other 
selection strategies are possible) and also all polynomials involved in their reductions, 
which are determined during the Symbolic preprocessing phase. By computing the 
reduced row echelon form of this matrix, we obtain the reduced S-polynomials of all 
pairs considered. This algorithm, combined with an efficient implementation of linear 
algebra, yields very good results. A complete description of this F4 is presented below 
(algorithm 1, 2, 3, 4). For a more detailed discussion we refer the reader to [7]. 
 
Algorithm 1  F4 
Input:
 1 2
( , , , ) mmF f f f R   
Output: The Gröbner bases of F. 
Initialization: :G  and :P   and : 0d   
1.while F   do 
2.  f := first(F) 
3.  F := F \ {f} 
4.  (G,P) := Update(G,P,f) 
5.while P   do 
6.  d := d+1 
7.  Pd := Select(P) 
8.  P := P\Pd 
10. 




11.  for dh F
   do 
12.    (G,P) :=Update(G,P,h) 
13.return G 
 
Algorithm 2  Reduction 
Input: dP  a finite subset of selected critical pairs 
       G a finite subset of R[x] 
       1 , , ( 1 )( )k k dF    , where kF  is finite subset of R[x] 
Output:  two finite subsets of R[x] 
1.  F := Symbolic Preprocessing( dP ,G, ) 
2. F := Reduction to Row Echelon Form of F w.r.t. < 
3. : { | ( ) ( )}F f F HT f HT F      
4. return ( ,F F ) 
 
Algorithm 3  Symbolic Preprocessing 
Input: dP  a finite subset of selected critical pairs 
       G a finite subset of R[x] 
       1 , , ( 1 )( )k k dF    , where kF  is finite subset of R[x] 
Output:  a finite subsets of R[x] 
1. 
1 2( , ) 1 1 2 2
{mult(Simplify( , , )),mult(Simplify( , , ))}
dC f f P
F u f u f    
2. Done := HT(F) 
3. While T(F) ≠ Done do 
4.   m an element of T(F) \ Done 
5.   Done := Done ∪ {m} 
6.   if m top reducible module G then 
7.     m = ( )m HT f  for some f G  and some m T  
8.     F := F∪{mult(Simplify( , ,m f  ))} 
9. return F 
 
Algorithm 4  Simplify 
Input:  t T  a term 
       [ ]f R x  a polynomial 
       1 , , ( 1 )( )k k dF    , where kF  is finite subset of R[x] 
Output: a non evaluated product, i.e. an element of T×R[x] 
1. for ulist of divisors of t do 
2.   if  j(1 j d  ) such that ( ) ju f F   then 
3.     
jF
  is the row echelon form of jF  w.r.t. < 
4.     There exists a (unique) jp F
   such that ( ) ( )HT p HT u f   
5.     if u t  then 





7.     else 
8.       return(1, p) 
9. return (t, f) 
 
3 ADAPTING F4 FOR THE FINITE FIELDS OVER GF(2) 
In order to detect some hidden property of F4 over GF(2). We must adapt F4 for the 
finite fields over GF(2) by using some property of GF(2). And then we accelerate the 
speed of F4 algorithm over GF(2) without changing the framework of F4 algorithm. 
3.1 Taking the Field Equations into Account 
For cryptographic purpose, solutions in the algebraic closure are irrelevant for us. 
Usually, only solutions over the finite fields are of importance. For a polynomial ring 
R=Fq[X] we can write the set of field equations of the form x
q
-x=0 for all x X . A 
potential way to deal with this issue is to try to adjoin the set of field polynomials to 
the list of equations that we want to solve. Consequently we have to compute the 
Gröbner bases of m + n polynomials and n variables. In fact, the more equations you 
have the more able you are to compute a Gröbner bases. In addition, by adjoining the 
set of all field polynomials F to the initial set of polynomials I, we in effect force the 
exponents of variables in all polynomials in the middle bases and final Gröbner bases 
during the computation of F4 to be fixed under the automorphism qx x . Of 
particular interest in the case q=2, where we can easily have the following simple 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: By adjoining the set of field polynomials to the initial polynomial 
ideal in R=F2[X] with n variables, the maximal degree of all polynomials in the 
middle bases and final Gröbner bases during the computation of F4 is at most n. 
In fact, taking the field equations into account for Gröbner bases algorithm has 
also been discussed previously. We mention it here, it is just because it is a foundation 
of our following improvements. In addition, we want to stress its importance for F4 
by some experiments and in Sec.5 we will give the real reason why adding field 
equations have the ability to improve the efficiency of the algorithm. Experimental 
results to compare Field-equations-adding F4 (FE-F4 for short) with the original F4 
for some HFE systems and some classical benchmarks (Cyclic 6, Gonnet83) are 
presented in Table 1. The total time in seconds and the max memory in Megabytes are 
represented by “Time” and “Max-mem” respectively. From the experimental results, 
we can see adding field equations has the ability to improve the F4 algorithm 
drastically.  






F4 FE-F4 F4 FE-F4 
HFE(17,5) 2.465 0.047  4.832 3.099 
HFE(17,6) 15.054 0.094  12.812 3.132 
HFE(17,7) 97.578 0.188  77.944 3.282 
Gonnet83 14.259 1.684  19.380 5.988 
Cyclic 6 2.247 0.172  3.608 2.818 
 
  
3.2 Critical Pair or S-polynomial? 
In a sense, S-polynomial is equivalent to critical pair. However, after taking the field 
equations into account and doing some special processing during the F4 algorithm 
over GF(2), there exists a greatly different impact on process of Reduction between 
the using of S-polynomials and critical pairs. 
F4 works with critical pairs. The productions ( i iu f ) coming from the selected critical 
pairs are put into the set F during each iteration step of F4. And then subroutine 
Symbolic Preprocessing is executed to select and calculate all eligible reductors of F. 
All reductors are also put into F and then the reduced S-polynomials are calculated by 
doing Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay-style matrix constructed from F. In order 
to better understand the following improvement, here we must explain the generating 
process of reductors. A reductor h generated from middle bases G that satisfies the 
properties  LT ( ) ( ) \ ( )h m HT f T F HT F    for some  T  \ ( )m F HT F  and 
some f G , then ' mult(Simplify( , , ))= 'f m f m f    is put into F. Repeat this 
process until no reductors generate. We can clearly see that the number of monomials 
in the all productions ( i iu f ) F  coming from the selected critical pairs directly 
impact the number of generated reductors and the final size of matrix. So our goal is 
to reduce the number of the monomials in F. The exponents of all variables in the 
polynomials in middle bases are fixed under 2 by adjoining the set of all field 
polynomials to input system I over GF(2). This leads many the same monomials exist 
in the two productions ( i iu f ), ( j ju f ) coming from a critical pair (lcm,ui,fi,uj,fj). 
Unfortunately, these same monomials will mislead us to find some “redundant” 
reductors. For example: 1 2 3 4= , = 1, 1,I f xy x f yz z f xz f x y z          , we 
assume the critical pair 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , , , , )C f f xyz z f x f  is selected. Then 1zf xyz xz   
and 2xf xyz xz x    are put into set F. Then the algorithm tries to generate the 
reductors whose leading terms are xz and x during the first iteration of Symbolic 
Preprocessing phase. The goal of subprogram Reduction is to obtain the reduced 
S-polynomials of all critical pairs considered. If we compute the S-polynomial first: 
1 2 1 2( , ) - -( )S f f zf xf xyz xz xyz xz x x       and put the S-polynomial into set F, 
we only need to generate the reductor whose leading term is x during the first iteration 
step of Symbolic Preprocessing; nay, we could avoid many redundant computations in 
the next iteration of Symbolic Preprocessing because the “redundant” reductors whose 
leading term xz may generate new monomials. So, instead of working with critical 
pairs, we suggest the F4 algorithm works with S-polynomials over GF(2). 
In order to ensure the correctness of the algorithm, We should slightly modify 
some subprograms of F4 if we want to work with S-polynomials instead of critical 
pairs over GF(2). The set NEWF should be added in the subprogram Symbolic 
Preprocessing to record all the reductors. The set F  in subprogram Reduction is 
selected from polynomials in F  satisfies ( ) ( )HT f HT NEWF  instead of 
( ) ( )HT f HT F . This is because our goal is to obtain the reduced S-polynomials 
after row echelon computing phase. ( )HT NEWF  is the set of all leading terms of 
reductors. A polynomial f satisfies ( ) ( )HT f HT NEWF  in the row echelon form of 
the matrix is a reduced S-polynomial. 
By observing the polynomials during the computation process of F4 algorithm, 
we found that although the exponents of all variables in the polynomials in middle 
bases are fixed under 2 by adjoining the set of all field polynomials to the set of 
polynomials I over GF(2), there are still some polynomials with variables’ exponents 
higher than 2 appear during the computation process. This is because multiplications 
are done in the productions ( i iu f ) coming from the selected critical pairs and 
reductors. In order to get a greater efficiency of our improvement, it is better to 
compute the normal form of the productions with respect to field equations by 
top-reducing the productions ( i iu f ) appear with respect to field polynomials. Thus the 
exponents of all variables in the productions are fixed under 2. More monomials will 
be eliminated after constructing the S-polynomials from the critical pairs and less new 
monomials are introduced into matrix from the reductors. For example, Let
1 2 3= , =xz+yz+1,I f xy yz f f xy x     , we assume the selected critical pair is 
1 2( , )C f f , then 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2( , ) ( )S f f zf yf xyz yz xyz y z y yz y z y          . But 
if we top-reduce the productions 1zf  and 2yf  with respect to field polynomials first, 
1 2 1 2( , ) ' ( ) ( ) ( )S f f NormalForm zf NormalForm yf xyz yz xyz yz y y         . 
We need only to consider monomial y instead of 
2 2, ,yz y z y  in the next computation. 
Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are the modified Reduction and Symbolic 
Preprocessing respectively. For convenience, we name the improvement S-F4. 
 Algorithm 5  Reduction 
Input: dP  a finite subset of selected critical pairs 
       G a finite subset of R[x] 
       1 , , ( 1 )( )k k dF    , where kF  is finite subset of R[x] 
Output:  two finite subsets of R[x] 
1. F，NewF := Symbolic Preprocessing( dP ,G, ) 
2. F := Reduction to Row Echelon Form of F w.r.t. < 
3. : { | ( ) ( )}F f F HT f HT NEWF      
4. return ( ,F F ) 
Algorithm 6  Symbolic Preprocessing 
Input: dP  a finite subset of selected critical pairs 
       G a finite subset of R[x] 
       1 , , ( 1 )( )k k dF    , where kF  is finite subset of R[x] 
Output:  a finite subsets of R[x] 
1. 
1 2( , ) 1 1 2 2
{ ( ( ( , , ))) ( ( ( , , )))}
dC f f P
F NF mult Simplify u f NF mult Simplify u f     
2. Done := HT(F), NewF :={} 
3. While T(F) ≠ Done do 
4.   m an element of T(F) \ Done 
5.   Done := Done ∪ {m} 
6.   if m top reducible module G then 
7.   m = ( )m HT f  for some f G  and some m T  
8.   F := F ∪{ (mult(Simplify( , , )))NF m f  } 
9.   NewF := NewF ∪ { (mult(Simplify( , , )))NF m f  } 
10. return F, NewF 
Remark. "NF" is the abbreviation for "Normal Form" 
4 MIDDLE-SOLVING F4 
In this section, we will slightly modify the logic of the F4 algorithm to make it be 
more practical for cryptanalysis (especially algebraic attacks) to solve cryptosystems 
over GF(2). 
Usually, the key of algebraic attacks is solving multivariate polynomial equations. 
Gröbner bases is one of the most efficient algorithms to solve the system of equations. 
More precisely, we can decompose the algorithm in two distinct steps when we use 
Gröbner bases to solve the system of equations: first we should compute the Gröbner 
bases of the initial polynomials system, then we get the value of the variables from the 
Gröbner bases with other algorithm (e.g. with Berlekamp’s algorithm). Gröbner bases 
just serves as an intermediate step to solve systems of polynomial equations 
symbolically. In the suitable term orders (e.g. lexicographical orders), the solutions of 
the Gröbner bases can be easily computed by successively eliminating variables. 
However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, 
namely, we won’t get any information if we couldn’t work out the Gröbner bases of 
the polynomial equations system. This drawback greatly restricts the practicability of 
algebraic attacks. Our goal is to overcome this drawback, getting some information 
during the computation process of F4 algorithm and accelerating the F4 algorithm. 
In many experiments with our improved F4 algorithm described Section.3, we 
have observed that after the Gaussian elimination step certain univariate polynomials 
appear. They are just treated like any other polynomials in the F4 algorithm. We must 
stress here that our ultimate aim is to obtain the solution of the initial equations 
system, not the Gröbner bases of the initial equations system. If those univariate 
polynomials have only one solution, they could be used beneficially in the algorithms. 
We show that they should deserve a special treatment. For the practical purposes, we 
slightly modify the logic of the F4 algorithm. At each iteration of the algorithm, solve 
these univariate polynomials and back-substitute the values of the solved variables to 
all polynomials in the set of middle bases G, the set of critical pairs P, and the set  . 
And then delete the zero elements in these sets. We can image that the benefits of such 
improvement is huge. It will cause a series of chain reactions, this makes the whole 
algorithm get relatively simpler than before, even though only a value of one variant 
is obtained. And even though we couldn’t work out the Gröbner bases, some 
information of the variable still leak during the computation process. We name our 
improvement Middle-Solving F4. We must stress that the heuristic strategy of 
Middle-Solving has never been applied to Gröbner bases algorithms until now. We 
mention that our heuristic strategy, by design, will boost the performance of all 
Gröbner bases algorithms in the same way as it aids F4 algorithm. 
Solving the univariate polynomials is a basic idea for solving equations. Existing 
algorithms for Gröbner bases are generally only concerned with how to quickly get 
Gröbner bases. The strategy of Middle-Solving breaks the consistent thinking of 
Gröbner basis algorithms for solving equations. Middle-Solving F4 introduces no 
spurious solutions, destroys no solutions. In fact, during the computation process of 
Middle-Solving F4, once a value of variable is obtained, the following operation is 
equivalent to computing Gröbner bases with respect to the unsolved variables. During 
the process of solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations, the less number 
of equations and variables, the less computational complexity needed to find the 
solution. In the worst case that no one value of the variable is obtained, the 
Middle-Solving F4 is just equivalent to F4. A formal description and a flowchart of 
the Middle-Solving F4 are presented in Algorithm 7 and Figure 1 respectively. 
Algorithm 7  Middle-Solving F4 
Input:
 1 2
( , , , ) mmF f f f R   
Output: The Gröbner bases of F. 
Initialization: :G  and :P   and : 0d   
1. while F   do 
2.   f := first(F) 
3.   F := F \ {f} 
4.   (G,P) := Update(G,P,f) 
5. while P   do 
6.   d := d+1 
7.   Pd := Select(P) 
8.   P := P\Pd 
9. 
  1 , , ( 1 )




10.   UP := [f : f in dF
  | IsUnivariate(f)]; 
11.   if UP is not Empty then 
12.     R := [f : f in UP | #Roots(UnivariatePolynomial(f)) eq 1]; 
13.     for r in R do 
14.       root := Solve(UnivariatePolynomial(r)); 
15.     Renew(G,P, )     // Back-substitute the values of the solved variables 
16.   for dh F
   do 
17.     (G,P) :=Update(G,P,h) 
18. return G 
 












5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, experimental results are presented to compare our improvement to 
Faugère’s F4. We take an interest in solving systems of some classical benchmarks 
(Cyclic 6 , Gonnet83) and some HFE(17,n) cryptosystems generated by Segers [13], 
where 17 is the degree restriction of the hidden polynomial used to generate the public 
key polynomials, n is number of variables and generated polynomials. The 
implementations in this section are all written by Magma version (V2.11-11). Our F4 
program is written according to the pseudo code of Faugère’s F4 and not join other 
implementation techniques, such as sparse matrix techniques, etc. We regard it as a 
benchmark for our improvement to prove the effectiveness of our improvement. So 
our improvements can be applied to the implementation of the different people, 
including the Gröbner bases program building in Magma 
In order to comprehend why our variant can improve the F4 drastically, timings 
and memory alone are not enough for the comparison. They are only the intuitive 
reflection to the efficiency of the algorithm and depend heavily on the efficiency of 
some hidden algorithms. It is well-known that the most time-consuming part of F4 
consists in the reduction operations. Thus an accurate comparison would consider: 
 The number of critical pairs considered, which is denoted by “C-Pair”. 
 The largest number of rows in the reduction matrix, which is denoted by 
“L-Matrix”. 
 The total number of reductors considered, which is denoted by “Reductor”. 
 The highest degree of final Gröbner bases, which is denoted by 
“H-Deg-GB”. 
 The number of final Gröbner bases, which is denoted by “#GB”. 
Table 2 gives some key datas during the computation process of the experiments 
we did in Table 1. From Table 2, we can easily get the reason that why adding field 
equations has the ability to improve the F4 algorithm drastically over GF(2). After 
adding the field equations to the initial equations system, the number of critical pairs 
considered and the largest number of rows in the reduction matrix decrease drastically. 
This is mainly because that lots of the redundant critical pairs are avoided by the 
Gebauer–Möller Criterion during the update phase. And the limitation of the 
exponents of the variables also plays a very important role. The datas need to be 
computed decease a lot, so it is not surprising that the time and the max memory 
decrease as described in Table 1. We notice that the highest degree of final Gröbner 
bases decrease a lot. It is simpler for us to solve the Gröbner bases by other algorithm. 
Adding field equations to the initial equations system can accelerate the F4 algorithm 
and needs less memory. So we regard the FE-F4 as a benchmark. The following 
experiment results of our variants all compare to the FE-F4 unless stated. 









F4 FE-F4 F4 FE-F4 F4 FE-F4 
HFE(17,5) 98 32  311 49  32 3  
HFE(17,6) 209 51  795 77  17 3  
HFE(17,7) 401 82  2053 106  15 3  
Gonnet83 1154 309  1216 571  6 4  
Cyclic 6 180 60  206 75  13 6  
 
Table 3 shows the results after we work with the S-polynomials instead of 
critical pairs for HFE systems. “n” denotes the number of equations and the number 
of variables for each initial system. The total time of Reduction subprogram is 
denoted by “R-Time”. In each case, FE-F4 and S-F4 compute almost the same 
number of critical pairs, because working with the S-polynomials instead of critical 
pairs almost only affect the number of reductors during the Reduction phase. In 
Faugère’s F4, the number of reductors generated by Symbolic Preprocessing and the 
final size of matrix are decided by number of the monomials in selected critical pairs. 
However, in our S-F4, they are decided by number of the monomials in 
S-polynomials generated from selected critical pairs. It is obviously that the number 
of the monomials in S-polynomials is far less than the monomials in critical pairs over 
GF(2). In addition, the number of the monomials farther decreases by top-reducing 
the productions appear with respect to field equations during the Reduction phase. 
Due to the decrease of the number of reductors generated by Symbolic Preprocessing 
and the final size of matrix, the workload of Symbolic Preprocessing and Gaussian 
elimination in the subprogram Reduction decreases. So the total time of subprogram 
Reduction of S-F4 is far less than FE-F4. 












FE-F4 S-F4  FE-F4 S-F4  FE-F4 S-F4  FE-F4 S-F4  FE-F4 S-F4  
9 243 243  785 208  6 6  3924 879  6.972 1.216 
10 455 455  1463 310  7 7  10623 2090  31.608 4.591 
11 705 711  2368 527  8 7  22395 3670  127.635 13.85 
12 794 794  1650 537  7 7  10664 2678  40.932 9.921 
13 1407 1407  2773 960  7 7  22090 5276  181.396 42.446 
Remark. The Reduction subprogram of S-F4 here includes the computation of 
S-polynomials and the computation the normal form to the productions. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the internal data and the performance of the Middle-Solving 
F4 for HFE systems respectively. The number of solved variables and total iteration 
round of the algorithm are represented by “#Solved” and “Round” respectively. 
Through the improvements in the Section 3, at least four univariate equations appear 
in our experiments (HFE(17,10) and HFE(17,11)). Once a variable is obtained, the 
following computation may be far easier. By comparing the internal data, including 
the number of reductors, the max size of matrix and total iteration round, we can see 
the workload of Middle-Solving F4 is far less than FE-F4. This is the reason why 
Middle-Solving F4 always outperforms EF-F4 in terms of memory and time. The 
more difficult the equations system is, the more obvious our advantage will be. Since 
the values of some variables are obtained, the highest degree and the number of final 
Gröbner bases computed by Middle-Solving F4 are both lower than FE-F4. 










FE-F4 M-S M-S FE-F4 M-S FE-F4 M-S 
9 785 153  5  13 12  3924 617 
10 1463 215  4  20 18  10623 1357 
11 2368 274  4  26 25  22395 2573 
12 1650 504  7  17 14  10664 1785 
13 2773 588  7  21 18  22090 3697 
 










FE-F4 M-S FE-F4 M-S FE-F4 M-S FE-F4 M-S 
9 148 76  6 3  7.971 1.747  11.571 4.049 
10 272 226  7 4  36.676 8.128  33.434 5.115 
11 385 343  8 4  138.544 21.06  79.745 7.278 
12 457 219  7 3  58.984 20.311  36.056 8.658 
13 769 478  7 3  254.5 95.862  101.219 16.028 
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTRUE WORK 
For practical purpose, we in-depth research the F4 algorithm for cryptanalysis 
(especially algebraic attacks) to solve cryptosystems over GF(2). In order to overcome 
the serious drawback of the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks that no information 
leak if we couldn’t work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system, a 
new variant named Middle-Solving F4 is presented in this paper. Even though we 
couldn’t work out the Gröbner bases, some information of the variable still leak 
during the computation process. So our variant is well adapted for algebraic attacks on 
cryptosystems. Experimentally, Middle-Solving F4 outperforms Faugère’s F4 in terms 
of memory and time. We believe that the heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving is a 
general approach that can improve most of the Gröbner bases algorithms. And the 
Middle-Solving F5 is in the process of being implemented and should be available 
soon. 
Guessing some bits during the computing Gröbner bases in many cases is a 
surprisingly effective way of accelerating the solution of the polynomial systems of 
equations. It is more effective but intractable than Hybrid approach [16], which guess 
some bits before computing Gröbner bases. We plan to mix between the “guess and 
determine” method and our Middle-Solving F4 or other Gröbner bases algorithms to 
farther improve the practicability of algebraic cryptanalysis. 
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